Turkish dictatorship gathers all Jihadists in Turkey. With the EU money they are trained politically and militarily in Turkey to invade EU countries.
For years now, Turkish fighters traveling to Syria have been a concern for the EU. Turkey has become the preferred transit route for jihadists heading to the Middle East, a circumstance the EU hopes to change.
Idlib is home to some of the largest Islamist factions, including ISIS and al-Qaeda-leaning groups, sponsored by Turkey. The recapture of Idlib by the Syrian army will mean that the thousands of jihadists manning the groups backed by Turkey in the city have nowhere to go, except for Libya.
By relocating these jihadists to Europe, Turkey may be hitting several goals at the same time, including getting rid of them from their own borders, securing its economic interests in EU.
Turkish offensive in Syria
Since the beginning of the civil war in Syria, neighboring Turkey has been a shelter for approximately 3 million refugees but also an important transit country for young Islamists on their way to fight “Holy War”. It is estimated that between 82,000 and 95,500 jihadists are fighting in Syria.
In a report from October 2020 the human rights organization Human Rights Watch accused Turkish authorities of allowing fighters to enter northern Syria to join the fight against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In addition, the report stated that fighters had received medical care in Turkey and that Turkey had delivered money and weapons to the terrorists.
Jihadist killers most dangerous in EU
Erdogan has deliberately made himself a lightning rod, trying to benefit from the tensions within Europe over Islam by claiming he is the defender of all Muslims.
This comes at a time the dangers from the infiltration of terrorists from Turkey into Europe are becoming real.
Dozens of jihadists sent by Turkey to EU, according to a number of agencies, including the London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.
It’s an odd experience flying in to Hatay, southern Turkey, on the border with Syria and its nasty and seemingly infinite war these days: there is a truly international flavor to the passenger manifests.As we flew in, there were two men from Mauritania, one with a limp, accompanied by a woman from Tunisia. On another flight which we saw land, two young men with large backpacks, coming from Benghazi. On another, four Libyans, also from Benghazi.Then a young, bearded man with a noticeably thick northern British accent, there to collect a friend from Leicester — the pair absolutely don’t want to talk, especially when I offer them a CNN business card. Then come the Egyptians, and a Gulf Arab — he sounded Saudi — who frantically kissed and embraced the bemused driver there to pick him up.All these were men travelling in small groups or alone. Most refused to talk at all about why they were there, although the man from Leicester said he was doing humanitarian work, and the Benghazi pair were open about the fact that they were going to Syria.It’s not a crime to travel to southern Turkey, and there are many foreign aid groups here, so surely many people are traveling innocently. But it is extraordinary to watch this volume of international traffic from countries where al Qaeda has a confirmed and consistent presence into a NATO member state. You find yourself asking: why are these men here, and why don’t they want to talk about it?
Turkish support to jihadists is not merely a tactic aimed at removing Assad from power. It stems from a strategic decision on the part of Turkish authorities to influence Middle East affairs through non-state actors, much as Iran has been doing for some time. Turkey’s support of jihadists transiting into Syria and its establishment of close ties with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood are joint aspects of this strategy. Turkish authorities have permitted Al Qaeda sympathizers to use pro-government media to promote their beliefs. The authorities have adopted a new political language that fuels anti-American and anti-Western sentiments. Prosecutors who have attempted to prevent shipments of weapons to Al Qaeda–affiliated groups in Syria have been fired and in some cases incarcerated. Indeed, by now Turkish prosecutors and the Turkish National Police are thoroughly intimidated. Not a single counterterror operation has been launched to disrupt Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)’s networks or recruitment activities. The Turkish National Intelligence Organization has been given full responsibility to deal with jihadist activities, without any active oversight, and the police are loath to venture into their territory. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Turkey’s jihadi policies have direct and indirect impact on Western security. This article examines Turkey’s jihadi policies by examining official statements, media reports, interviews, and fieldwork.
The jihadists sent by Turkish President Recep Tyyip Erdogan to Europe
Nonetheless, instead of the regular Turkish troops, the Turkish President is sending the jihadists who backed his military offensive against the Kurds in northern Syrian late last year.
ISIS’s rise in Turkey closely followed on the group’s
successes in Syria and Iraq. However, the group’s
cross-border infrastructure, which is used to ferry
recruits and supplies to the caliphate from Turkey, is
built on decades-old al-Qaeda and like-minded jihadist
networks based in numerous Turkish cities, and was
previously used as a secondary route for jihadists to
join the Iraq jihad during the US occupation between
2003 and 2011. From the outset of the conflict in Syria,
Turkish citizens travelled back and forth, oftentimes
joining with Turkish-speaking sub-groups in larger, antiregime opposition groups, the two most prominent of
which are Syria’s al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat Fateh alSham (Syria’s rebranded al-Qaeda affiliate, previously
named Jabhat al-Nusra, or the Nusra Front) and the
Salafi Ahrar al-Sham. With the rise of ISIS in 2013, Turks
began to travel to the caliphate, where they joined with
Turkish-speaking units, complete
with Turkish imams and military
trainers. The available opensource evidence points to a slight
difference in Turkish ISIS and alQaeda members. In the case of the
latter, the fighters tend to be older,
whereas Turkish ISIS members
are younger.3 However, there are
exceptions, underscoring the need
for more data to draw definitive
conclusions about “typical” Turkish